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ABSTRACT 
 
This article examines the impact of Objective One funding in Europe in 
reducing country and regional disparities in GVA per capita by 
presenting a critical review of both empirical studies and end of term 
program reports. In practice, it is very difficult to establish impact 
effects as it is hard to establish the counterfactual. This arises as a 
consequence of different theoretical predictions as to what would 
happen in the absence of intervention, overlapping funding streams 
and the regional impact of other policies such as European integration. 
There are also evaluation problems caused by data inadequacies and 
noise. Even so, the balance of evidence suggests that Objective One 
funding has had remarkably little demonstrable impact and there is, 
therefore, a strong case for reform. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The EU has devoted considerable resources to improving the 
performance of lagging regions since the early 1980s. In 1987 around 
20 per cent of the EU budget was devoted to Structural Funds, a 
percentage which grew to more than 35 per cent by 1999.  Planned 
expenditure is then fell slightly but was still expected to be €29.1bn at 
1999 prices in 2006 and was now concentrated much more on those 
areas in greatest need of support than it was in previous years.  
Indeed, for the Programming Period 2000-2006, some 40% of the EU 
15 population was covered by EU regional policy objectives compared 
with 52% for 1994-1999. 
 
In order to qualify for funding, regions have to meet certain criteria. For 
1994-1999, four major categories were identified. First was Objective 1, 
which covered NUTS II regions for which GVA per capita was less than 
75% of the EU average. Second was Objective 2, which was reserved 
for NUTS II regions, or parts of regions, seriously affected by industrial 
decline. In addition, Objective 5b funding was aimed at the 
development and structural adjustment of rural areas, whilst Objective 
6 was targeted at areas with very low population density. For 2000-
2006, Objectives 1 and 6 were combined in a new Objective 1 as were 
2 and 5b as a new Objective 2.  Moreover, the latter now included 
urban areas dependent on fishing or highly service sector dependent 
areas undergoing conversion problems. 
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In the three programming periods from 1988 to 2006, more than two 
thirds of Structural Funding Spending was spent on Objective 1 and 6 
regions and from 2000 this took around 70% of the total.  
Approximately 11.5% of funding was allocated to Objective 2 regions, 
less than the 16% allocated to Objectives 2 and 5 from 1994-99.  The 
rest of the Structural Fund resources were allocated to non territorial 
Objectives (e.g. Objective 3 aimed at supporting the adaptation and 
modernisation of education, training and employment policies and 
systems) and to specific Community Initiatives such as INTERREG and 
URBAN. 
 
Given the substantial resources involved and the political emphasis 
placed by the EU on regional policy, the effectiveness of such funding 
is an issue of major concern. This paper concentrates on the 
evaluation of Objective One funding. There are a number of reasons 
which justify this focus. First, as has already been noted, Objective 
One funding was more than two thirds of total Structural Fund 
expenditure.  Second, the qualification principle was based on a simple 
quantitative indicator (GVA per capita) which, in theory, provides a 
simple basis for testing whether Objective 1 funding has improved the 
relative position of target regions. Thus, the key question for evaluation 
is whether EU funding has led to reduced disparities in levels of GVA 
per capita. A third justification is that, whilst there has been 
considerable research that directly or indirectly examines the impact of 
Objective One, the research uses a variety of theoretical frameworks 
and methodologies and presents a confusing picture. Consequently, 
there is a strong case for providing a synthesis and overview of this 
literature. 
 
The paper begins with an examination of EU country and regional 
disparities and of the justification for an interventionist regional policy. 
There is then an overview of some of the problems involved in 
assessing the impact of Objective One funding including different 
theoretical perspectives, poor data, overlapping policies and noise 
arising from policy shocks. This is followed by a discussion of the 
results emerging from a wide variety of empirical literature that is 
directly or indirectly relevant to evaluation including convergence 
models, non-convergence approaches, simulation models and case 
studies of individual regions. The final section considers the 
implications of the analysis for future EU regional policies.  
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REGIONAL DIFFERENCES AND JUSTIFICATION FOR REGIONAL 
POLICY 
 
There are major disparities in the economic performance of constituent 
countries and regions of the European Union.  They have been there 
from the start but have been accentuated with enlargement and 
particularly with the accession of several eastern European countries in 
2004.  Some details are given in Table 1 which shows that, in 2002, 
GVA per capita varied from a low of 39% of the EU average in Latvia to 
a high of 213% of the EU average in Luxembourg. 
 
Table 1 GVA per head in purchasing power parities (EU 25=100) 
  
EU 25 100 
EU 15 109 
New member states 52 
Belgium 117 
Czech Republic 68 
Denmark 123 
Germany 109 
Estonia 47 
Greece 78 
Spain 95 
France 113 
Ireland 133 
Italy 109 
Cyprus 83 
Latvia 39 
Lithuania 42 
Luxembourg 213 
Hungary 59 
Malta 73 
Netherlands 122 
Austria 121 
Poland 46 
Portugal 77 
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Slovenia 75 
Slovakia 51 
Finland 114 
Sweden 115 
UK 118 
 Source: Eurostat. 
 
At regional level (table 2), the highest and lowest figures were for Inner 
London in the UK (315) and for Lubelskie in Poland (32).  Moreover, 
there were considerable differences within countries most notably (if 
Inner London is regarded as a special case) within Germany, Italy and 
the Czech Republic.  In Germany, the lowest figure was for Dessau 
(66) in the former GDR.  This contrasted with 189 for Hamburg.  For 
Italy, there was a difference of 92 index points between Bolzano (160) 
and Calabria (68), while in the Czech Republic there were big 
differences between Prague and the rest. 
   
Table 2 GVA per head in purchasing power parities (EU 25=100) 
Ten Highest and Lowest Regions. 
Highest  
Inner London (UK) 315 
Brussels Capital (Belg) 234 
Luxembourg 213 
Hamburg (Ger) 188 
Ile de France (Fr) 176 
Vienna (Aus) 174 
Berks, Bucks, Oxon (UK) 
 
162 
Bolzano (It) 160 
Stockholm (Sw) 158 
Oberbayern (Ger) 158 
Lowest  
Lubelskie (Pol) 32 
Podkarpackie (Pol) 33 
Warminsko-Mazurskie 
(Pol) 
34 
Podlaskie (Pol) 35 
Swietokrzyskie (Pol) 36 
Eszak Magyaroszag 
(Hun) 
37 
Opolskie (Pol) 37 
Eszag-Alfold (Hun) 38 
Vychodne Slovensko 
(Pol) 
39 
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Latvia 39 
Source: Eurostat 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the early years of the EU, regional differences were not a major 
concern of policy makers at supra national level, partly perhaps 
because those differences were less marked among the original 
members and partly because other issues took precedence at that time  
Gradually, however, an interventionist regional policy became more 
and more of a priority. 
 
The policy adopted was essentially one of developing the capacity of 
the poorer regions to improve their performance rather than directly 
encouraging people in those regions to move to more prosperous parts 
of the Community.  There are a number of theoretical justifications for 
such an approach, though some of these are social and political rather 
than economic (see for example Martin 2005).  
 
One is the equity or fairness argument that it is not acceptable for 
different parts of the EU to have much lower levels of income and rates 
of employment than others.  A second is that policy can ease the 
adjustment problems of economies undergoing major transformation in 
response to shocks such as the integration policies of the EU.  A third 
is that regional policy enables the employment of under utilised 
resources of problem areas, whether these are social capital or under 
utilised labour resources.  This argument may be particularly valid if 
highly prosperous regions are congested and consequently impose 
higher production costs on businesses located in them.  A final 
argument in favour of regional policy of the type adopted by the EU is a 
macro economic management one and is that if production is spread 
more evenly over the whole EU, then, the level of output at which 
inflationary pressures begin to bite and corrective action taken may be 
higher than would otherwise be the case. 
 
As Martin (2005) points out, the clear separation of the respective 
justifications is rarely possible.  For example, it is far from clear that 
equity is comparable with maximum economic efficiency or output or, 
therefore, overall economic welfare (Alesina and Rodrik, 1994).  In the 
context of the EU, therefore, it might be ultimately self defeating if 
attempts to reduce regional disparities affected the overall 
competitiveness of the EU in a world context exacerbating the 
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problems of the poorly performing regions and the scope of people in 
them to move to jobs elsewhere.  It is certainly an issue why more 
congested regions continue to grow and why so few businesses 
choose to relocate from them to less congested ones.  Market failure is 
a possibility but so is the fact that the benefits of agglomeration 
continue to outweigh the costs. 
 
In any event, realpolitik is an important consideration and it may be 
argued that one of the strongest justifications for regional policy at EU 
level, historically, is that it has been necessary to induce widening 
membership and persuade constituent countries to sign up for 
integrationist policies so necessary to ensure continued European 
competitiveness in world markets. 
 
Even so, there is still an issue of how far to go down the interventionist 
regional policy road in terms of expenditure, which policies to adopt 
and how many and which type of regions to target.  As we will see, 
there are different theoretical perspectives on all these points. 
 
 
 
 
 
MONITORING AND EVALUATION IN THE EU 
 
The idea of evaluation made its first formal appearance in the EU Fund 
Regulations of 1988. However, the requirements for evaluation have 
since developed in scope and sophistication, to encompass evaluation 
at the policy, programme and project level, and, at the beginning, 
interim and completion stage of a policy cycle (European Commission, 
1997 1999a, 1999b and 1999c). Ex-ante evaluation addresses the 
question ‘is it a good programme’ by examining the linkage and 
consistency between global objectives, specific objectives and 
programme measures; the existence and relevance of the output, 
result and impact indicators and the reliability of the level of 
quantification of the objectives.  Mid-term evaluation examines whether 
the programme remains relevant to local needs, the degree of 
effectiveness achieved as reflected in the monitoring indicators, the 
quality and relevance of these indicators, and the quality of programme 
management. Finally, ex post evaluation uses final monitoring data to 
compare the expected objectives with those actually achieved, as well 
as attempting to assess the long run impact of the programme.  
 
This paper is primarily concerned with assessing the long term impact 
of Objective One funding in reducing disparities in GVA per head and 
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thus focuses on ex post evaluation. In making such an evaluation it is 
critical to establish the counter factual case – that is, what would have 
happened to GVA per head in Objective One regions if they had not 
been in receipt of EU funding? Unfortunately, this exercise is fraught 
with difficulties. In particular, four issues are of major concern: different 
theoretical perspectives, poor data, overlapping policies and noise.  
These issues are now examined in turn. 
 
There is little theoretical agreement as to whether, in the absence of 
intervention, the economic performance of regional economies will tend 
to converge to a common growth rate, converge to a number of distinct 
growth “clubs”, exhibit long term divergence or involve more complex 
spatial patterns involving elements of divergence, convergence and 
persistence (e.g. Bishop and Gripaios, 2006; Boldrin and Canova, 
2001; Corrado et al, 2006). For example, a simple neoclassical 
perspective based upon the Solow growth model and involving the 
critical assumption of diminishing returns predicts that regions with 
identical preferences and technologies will converge. This arises as 
poor regions with low capital to labour ratios have high marginal 
products of capital which attracts capital migration and grow faster than 
richer countries with higher capital to labour ratios (Barro, 1991). 
Consequently, if labour and capital are mobile, regions will converge to 
a common steady state growth rate and regional disparities can be 
eliminated without state intervention. More sophisticated versions of 
the theory allow for the impact of differing structural influences across 
regions. In this case, regions with similar structural characteristics 
converge to specific “steady state” convergence clubs involving 
differing levels of per capita income. Consequently, only policy 
interventions aimed at these structural factors can potentially move 
regions to higher steady states. 
 
Alternative approaches to mainstream neo-classical growth theory 
frequently predict long-term divergence of per capita incomes.  Early 
approaches were based on the cumulative causation hypotheses of 
Myrdal (1957) and Hirschman (1958); later ones have been given the 
label of endogenous growth theory.  In both versions, it is postulated 
that there are considerable agglomeration benefits arising from spatial 
concentration such that certain high growth regions benefit from a 
“virtuous circle” of growth.  Central to the theory are interactions 
between human and physical capital and between individual firms such 
that there may be non-diminishing returns to capital in the aggregate 
and, therefore, no limits to the growth of the capital stock or output. In 
particular, the accumulation of knowledge may not be affected by 
diminishing returns. Rather, as Ederveen et al (2002) point out, the 
return on investment in technology may increase with the stock of 
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accumulated knowledge since the cost of additional innovations may 
fall as scientific experience increases. Rich regions may find it easier to 
innovate and, therefore, increase their lead, while poor regions stay 
that way because they do not have the same potential to invent and 
innovate. In this scenario, there is a rather stronger justification for 
policy interventions aimed at moving regions from the lagging to the 
dynamic category. However, it is hard to imagine that all regions can 
benefit in this way, for the whole emphasis of the theory is that some 
regions will grow faster than others. One possible implication is that 
policy may need to concentrate selectively on those regions with the 
most potential for moving from backward to dynamic. 
. 
A further theoretical standpoint emanates from what may loosely be 
called new economic geography models (NEG), though the extent to 
which these differ from the endogenous growth approach is perhaps 
arguable. New economic geography models are again linked to the 
cumulative causation literature but focus specifically on the benefits of 
agglomeration. An early adherent was Williamson (1965) who 
postulated that national growth would be based on growth pole effects 
in key agglomerations which would result in widening disparities among 
regions until the possible onset of congestion costs put a break on the 
process. More recently, NEG models have been developed by 
Krugman (1991) and others, who demonstrate that agglomeration 
factors can lead to either divergence or convergence. Braunerhjelm et 
al (2000) suggest three different scenarios. One is that all regions are 
able to exploit their local comparative advantage, resulting in balanced 
regional development. A second is strong economies of agglomeration 
which would engender high labour mobility and convergence of per 
capita earnings. A third is strong agglomeration economies without 
labour mobility which would lead to polarisation of rich and poor 
regions. From this viewpoint the policy prescription is complex. 
Scenario one would imply helping all regions exploit their potential 
advantage, possibly lending credence to the recent focus on local and 
regional cluster development approaches. The second and third might 
imply policies aimed at facilitating labour migration.  
 
The complexities of modern growth theory suggest that the issue for 
evaluation concerns not only whether intervention is likely to work per 
se, but also the efficiency of the specific measures to be adopted.  For 
example, one important issue is transport infrastructure investments in 
problem peripheral regions which have been an important component 
of EU Structural Aid.  Since these typically improve access to the 
prosperous core, such investments may bring benefits to local 
suppliers in peripheral regions. However, improved transport linkages 
may also benefit core producers by making it easier to compete with 
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local producers that were protected by high transport costs. Work by 
Venables and Gasiorek (1999), Vickerman et al (1999) and Dall’erba 
and Gallo (2004) suggests that this is a very real problem.  
Consequently, policy design and evaluation needs to assess these 
opposing forces within the context of specific policies.  Similar issues 
may arise when other spill-over effects across regions are important. 
For example, the construction of a major project in a problem region 
could involve significant leakage during the construction phase if the 
architects, builders and much of the materials were sourced from a 
prosperous one. 
 
This brief discussion of alternative growth theories would suggest that 
there is little theoretical agreement on what would happen in the 
absence of intervention. Thus, the establishment of a counterfactual 
position from which to assess policy impacts is a difficult issue. If one 
believes that convergence would happen in the absence of policy 
intervention, then the counterfactual case will be very different from a 
perspective which regards long term disparities as persistent 
phenomena.  
 
A second problem for evaluation relates to data quality. Establishing 
the impact of a policy and the relevant counterfactual requires reliable 
statistics at the appropriate regional level. Unfortunately, there are 
major problems in this regard. Indeed, Combes and Overman (2004) 
go so far as to suggest that the “European data are a mess”, a situation 
that arises from “variations in collection policies, access and pricing 
conditions, confidentiality requirements and legal frameworks”. Typical 
problems include the non-availability/unreliability of GVA data for some 
countries and/or their constituent regions for some time periods or at 
an appropriate geographical level. This problem is illustrated by the fact 
that EU member countries have only recently adopted a consistent 
method of estimating GVA (Behrens, 2002). There are also significant 
problems with regional level GVA data for some individual countries. In 
the case of the UK, for example, a recent report by Allsop, (2003) 
comments that “at this level disaggregation, it is likely that the figures 
are little more than approximations”.  Gripaios and Bishop (2006) 
summarise a number of major issues associated with the quality of UK 
regional data including issues related to small samples sizes, 
apportionment of national data to a regional level, under-recording of 
economic activity and regional price variations.  
 
A third problem concerns identifying the impact of overlapping policies. 
At the EU scale, policies designed to improve supra-national EU 
performance (e.g. single market, single currency, key transport 
developments) may affect the effectiveness of Structural Fund 
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interventions both positively and negatively. In such circumstances, it is 
far from straightforward to disentangle the effects of one policy impact 
from another.  A related problem is that the macro-economic policies of 
member states have a dominant impact on the prosperity of domestic 
regions severely constraining the extent to which the Structural Funds 
could be expected to have had a measurable impact at a specific point 
in time. This is underlined by the very limited scale of the addition of 
Structural Fund spending to GDP in all but the most disadvantaged 
states.  Though it could be argued that such arguments would apply 
most strongly to regions in member states which have not joined the 
Euro, the lack of business cycle convergence within the Euro zone 
implies that the issue may apply here too. 
 
In addition to broad macroeconomic policy, there are other national 
policies with, often unintended, regional impacts.  Examples from the 
UK include privatisation which had the effect of stripping out well paid 
managerial jobs in the periphery of the UK (Gripaios and Munday, 
2000), decisions on the location of defence bases and facilities which 
have often assisted prosperous regions (Gripaios, 2002) and most 
recently the regional impact of a new funding regime in higher 
education.  It is interesting to note in the case of defence, for example, 
that more national money has been spent on the cost overrun of the 
Trident refit facility in one city, Plymouth, than will be spent by EU and 
national and regional sources as a result of Objective 1 in the whole of 
the adjacent County of Cornwall in the period 2000-2006. 
 
It is also important to recognise that there are typically a number of 
national, regional and local policies operating simultaneously with 
European ones targeted at the same outcome.  Consequently, as 
Pearce and Martin (1996) emphasise, it is difficult “to isolate the impact 
of any one agency’s funding and to identify separately the additionality 
of each of the contributions which were made”. This problem is 
compounded if one tries to consider the impact of what are seen as 
mainly national programmes, such as labour market interventions, but 
which are shaped by a limited percentage input of EU funds (ESF) to 
the extent that the nature of national policy has to have regard to EU 
priorities and guidelines.  Also of importance is the potential for 
“crowding out” with at least some public sector investments having the 
potential of displacing private sector ones.  This could involve short 
term gains at the expense of long run sustainability, especially where 
interventions largely involve a short term boost to demand and little 
strategic content. 
 
A fourth major problem is noise arising from the incidence of economic 
shocks which may have different effects on different regions at specific 
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points in time.  A rise in the oil price, for example, may have a much 
bigger adverse effect on industrial rather than service based regions 
while a movement in the terms of trade may have more effect on 
regions where exports are a relatively large component of output.  In 
such circumstances there may be a tendency, in some cases, to 
ascribe to policy interventions, benefits which have arisen elsewhere 
and, in others, to be too pessimistic about the impact of policy which 
may have mitigated what might otherwise have been seriously negative 
impacts. 
 
The above arguments suggest that, monitoring and evaluation is far 
more difficult in practice than might be inferred from the many official 
handbooks on the subject (Gresham and Jones, 1999; European 
Commission, 1999c). There is little agreement on what might have 
happened in the absence of intervention, poor quality data with which 
to establish policy impacts or the counterfactual case, multiple polices 
which might have important regional impacts and asymmetrical 
regional effects arising from economic shocks.  Recognising the nature 
and extent of these problems is crucial to the development of realistic 
expectations as to the extent to which the impact of policy interventions 
can be assessed.  
 
EVALUATING THE IMPACT OF OBJECTIVE 1 FUNDING:  
ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES 
 
This section presents an overview of empirical studies that either 
directly or indirectly have relevance for the assessment of the impact of 
Objective One funding. If it is accepted that the main long term purpose 
of Objective 1 funding is to raise GVA per capita in poorer regions 
relative to prosperous regions, then the issue of convergence (or 
reduced divergence) is key to the evaluation process. Consequently, 
the first part of this section examines alternative approaches that have 
been used to test for convergence and, at least in some cases, directly 
assess the role of EU funding in explaining changes in patterns of 
inequality across regions. This is followed by an examination of 
approaches which focus upon understanding the determinants of 
regional growth rather than focusing upon the convergence issue (non-
convergence models).  Two further sub-sections examine multi-
equation macro-econometric simulations and micro-economic case 
studies of individual regions..  
 
Convergence Models 
 
Perhaps the most commonly used methodology for assessing 
convergence is the β regression approach, which attempts to test the 
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hypotheses of convergence arising from the neoclassical growth model 
(Barro, 1991). For convergence to occur, poor regions must grow faster 
than their richer counterparts and a region’s per capita growth rate 
should be inversely related to its starting level of income per head. 
Absolute β convergence implies a significantly negative correlation 
between initial income and growth in a simple regression of growth on 
initial income, whilst conditional β convergence requires a negative 
correlation when the regression incorporates factors reflecting 
structural differences across regions (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995). 
This allows for different steady states depending upon a set of extra 
variables allowing for different investment rates, levels of human 
capital, levels of technology, levels of R&D, industrial structures and 
other variables 
 
In principle, the role of policy variables can be incorporated into the β 
regression approach by including regional funding as a structural factor 
in conditional regressions. However, much of the literature does not 
explicitly include such measures and hence is only of limited use for 
direct evaluation purposes. Nevertheless, this wider literature is useful 
in assessing the more general issue of the presence or absence of 
convergence which is of some importance in assessing counterfactual 
scenarios. Moreover, some inference of possible policy impacts can be 
garnered from contrasting the experience on assisted and non-assisted 
regions. Consequently, the analysis considers the wider literature as 
well as those studies that explicitly consider policy variables. 
 
A number of studies have examined absolute β convergence within the 
context of the European Union. Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991, 1992), 
for example, found evidence in favour of convergence for a sample of 
the regions of eight European countries.  However, their results only 
relate to the more prosperous parts of the EU and pre-date most of the 
period when the Structural Funds were used intensively.  Armstrong 
(1995) tested for absolute convergence in each decade from 1950-
1990 and, in general, convergence was observed but at a very low 
rate. Moreover, convergence was at a much slower rate in later relative 
to earlier decades especially within countries. A recent study by 
Ederveen et al (2002) found a clear pattern of convergence between 
12 EU countries between 1977 and 1996. Similarly, Garcia Solanes 
and Maria-Dolores (2002) found evidence for absolute convergence 
between 1989-96, as did Rodriguez-Pose and Fratesi (2004) for 1989-
99. The EU itself (European Commission 2004) found evidence for 
absolute convergence for the three periods, 1980-1988, 1988-94 and 
1994-2001. Moreover, within Objective One regions, those with the 
lowest initial starting levels of GVA per head tended to grow the fastest 
both from 1988-94 and 1994-2001. However, using data for EU NUTS 
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2 regions over the period 1980-96, Boldrin and Canova (2001) could 
find no evidence for absolute convergence. Moreover, for individual 
countries, Hoffer and Wargotter (1997) find no evidence of absolute 
convergence in Austria, Gripaios et al (2000) find none in the UK and 
Siriopoulos and Asteriou (1998), none for Greece.  
 
The results for absolute convergence hence present a conflicting 
pattern and the same is true for models of conditional convergence. 
Armstrong (1995) finds that conditional convergence in per capita 
incomes in EU regions is occurring but at a slow and slowing rate.  
Neven and Gouyette (1994) also report slow convergence for EU 
regions.  However, these results are contradicted by Button and 
Pentecost (1995). More recent studies include that of Boldrin and 
Canova (2001) for 1980-96, who try alternative specifications of the 
basic convergence model.  Their results, though mixed, are not 
supportive of conditional convergence in per capita incomes. Again, 
there are a number of studies of individual countries in receipt of 
Objective One funding which find little evidence of conditional 
convergence (see for example Siriopoulos and Asteriou (1998) on 
Greece; Mauro and Paudrecca (1994) on Italy and Gripaios et al 
(2000) on the UK).  However, Ederveen et al (2002), examine 
conditional convergence within 12 EU countries for various time 
periods, finding it in all countries except France, Italy and Sweden. The 
fastest rate of convergence was in Germany and was explained by the 
old East German regions catching up to those in the West, for there 
was no convergence among the latter group.  
 
It is important to note that whilst the β regression approach has been 
used extensively, it is subject to numerous criticisms. Friedman (1992) 
and Quah (1993a), for example, note that β  convergence tests are 
affected by Galton’s fallacy of regression towards the mean and may 
produce biased estimates, Moreover, as Cheshire and Magrini (2000) 
point out, the “traditional specifications witness a disproportionate 
presence of proxies for forces leading towards divergence among the 
conditioning variables. It is, therefore, hardly surprising that these 
analyses find a positive and statistically significant value for the 
estimate of the speed of convergence”. There are also severe 
methodological problems in incorporating policy variables into 
conditional equations including endogeneity and a variety of 
measurement issues (Temple, 1999, Dall’Erba and Gallo, 2004).  One 
obvious difficulty is that specifications involving both Structural Funding 
receipts and starting level of income are very likely to suffer from 
multicollinearity since a low starting level of income determines which 
regions get the lion’s share of funds.  A further point is that most 
empirical studies do not take into account spatial autocorrelation, a 
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strong possibility given likely spill-over effects between adjacent 
regions. 
 
A number of studies of conditional convergence specifically include 
Structural Fund components (or proxies) as variables. Cappelen et al 
(2001), for example, recognising the potential multicollinearity problem 
noted above, try to get around it by using a pooled time series, cross 
section approach.  The study suggests that EU Structural Fund 
spending has had a much greater positive impact on regional per 
capita incomes since the reforms of 1989.  However, strong boosts to 
divergence come from unfavourable industrial structure and lack of 
R&D in poorer regions.  Both of these are correlated with EU Structural 
Fund spending so there may be other specification problems. These 
issues may also apply to the formulations of Garcia Solanes and Maria-
Dolores (2001) who find that both the Structural Funds in total and their 
individual components have a positive effect on convergence among 
EU regions from 1989-96.  In contrast, Dall’erba and Gallo (2004) find 
that “steady states of regions do not seem to be significantly affected 
by the amount of Structural Funds they have received”.  An advantage 
of their study is recognition of spatial autocorrelation, tests of which do 
reveal significant spillovers from one region to another.  This is not 
surprising given that so much EU funding has been for improvements 
to transport infrastructure.   
 
Puigcerver-Penalver (2004) looks at the impact of Objective 1 funding 
in two periods from 1989-2000 using a hybrid conditional convergence 
model of growth with both exogenous and endogenous components.  
The hypothesis tested is that Structural Funds work through the 
creation of endogenous technical progress.  The study concludes that 
the impact of Structural Funds is very weak overall though much 
greater from 1989-93 than subsequently when it may even have been 
negative.  This leads the author to conclude that “…. placing too high 
expectations on the ability of the Structural Funds to reduce regional 
disparities could be misplaced”. 
 
Rodriguez-Pose and Fratesi (2004) find a very weak but positive 
impact of European Structural Funds on regional growth across 
Europe.  However, the effect is much weaker if only Objective 1 
regions are taken into account and disappears completely if Structural 
Fund allocations are split into regional and multiregional components.  
Various lag structures were tried to pick up delayed impacts but did not 
reveal any after as long as six years.  The authors conclude that too 
much focus on infrastructure, business support and agriculture and too 
little on education and human capital might be to blame for these weak 
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effects, emphasising the importance of the nature rather than simply 
the quantity of funding. 
 
A further study by Ederveen et al (2002) utilises national and regional 
panel data to examine cohesion policy and regional productivity on the 
E12 countries for 1960-1995.  The results suggest that cohesion 
support has not improved the growth performance of recipient regions. 
Indeed, there seems to be negative relationship.  A further interesting 
conclusion is that regional support such as ERDF works best in open 
economies such as Ireland.  Unfortunately, the role of openness cannot 
be tested on regions because the required data is not available.  A 
more restricted regression equation is, therefore, estimated for 183 
NUTS II regions for the period 1981-96. Two of the three specifications 
attempted do not suggest that the impact of EU regional funding has 
been positive.  The analysis also attempts to assess the extent of 
“crowding out”, defined as the extent to which regional aid from 
national sources is substituted by that from the EU.  The conclusion is 
that around 50% of EU aid crowds out national sources.  On average 
one Euro of cohesion support typically crowds out 17 cents of national 
regional policy.  
 
A second much used approach to testing for convergence is to use 
simple statistical measures that summarise changes in the distribution 
of per capita incomes across a set of regions over time. This approach, 
commonly referred to as σ convergence, typically utilises the standard 
deviation or coefficient of variation with a reduced figure for a later year 
relative to an earlier one being indicative of convergence.  Clearly, σ 
convergence only examines a simple moment of the distribution and 
provides no information on the movement of regions within it. 
Nevertheless, some insights may be gained by comparing the change 
in the standard deviation within member countries or groups of such 
countries (which may be considered as convergence clubs) with that 
for the full set of EU regions.   
 
The evidence for σ convergence is mixed, with important differences 
emerging according to the time period and sample of specific studies.  
For example, the early small sample study of Barro and Sala-i-Martin 
(1995) is generally supportive of convergence although the pattern 
differs over time and across countries. A number of more recent 
studies (e.g. Cappelen et al, 2001, Ederveen et al, 2002, Boldrin and 
Canova, 2001, European Commission (2004), Sapin et al (2004), 
Gardiner et al (2005)) report convergence between countries. 
However, Gardiner et al (2005) note that there is only convergence 
between countries from 1980-2002 if Luxembourg and Ireland are 
excluded from the analysis. Moreover, even this pattern of 
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convergence doesn’t apply to more recent periods. Similarly, a recent 
study of the post 1989 period by Rodriguez-Pose and Fratesi (2004) 
fails to support convergence.  
 
Mixed results also emerge from studies conducted at the regional 
rather than country level. For example, Boldrin and Canova (2001) find 
that while the standard deviation of regional per capita income falls 
slightly between 1980 and 1996, it oscillates widely during the period. 
Cappelen et al (2001) find no change in dispersion between 105 
European regions between 1980 and 1990 and an increase from 1990-
97.  However, these conclusions conflict with those of Ederveen et al 
(2002), who found convergence in a sample of 160 out of 210 regions 
in the period 1984-1996. Other European wide regional evidence 
comes from Estaban (1994) and more recently the EU (European 
Commission,2004, Sapir et al 2004 and Gardiner et al, 2005).  The 
results again vary with time and sample.   
 
Studies of σ convergence within individual EU countries also show a 
mixed pattern. Some countries with regions qualifying for Objective 
One appear to have experienced a divergence in regional per capita 
incomes.  This seems to have applied since the 1980s, for example, to 
Austria (Hoffer and Wargotter 1997) the UK (Gripaios et al 2000), 
Spain, Italy and Greece (Rodriguez-Pose and Fratesi 2004). However, 
Ederveen et al ‘s  (2002) study finds a clear tendency to convergence 
in all countries except France, Italy, the UK and Sweden. Slightly 
different results emerge from a study by Gardiner et al (2004) for 1979-
2003 which report a steady long term rise in regional inequality in the 
UK, Finland, Sweden and Ireland and the opposite in Belgium, Greece, 
Spain and Portugal.  
 
It is, therefore, difficult to make strong inferences about the role of 
Objective One funding from studies of σ convergence due both to the 
mixed results and the lack of specific modelling of the potential role of 
regional funding. However, Gardiner et al (2005) find that Objective 1 
regions improved relative to other regions in all periods since 1980 
except 1983-1986 and especially after the strengthening of regional 
support in the late 1980s.  This might offer some evidence in support of 
a positive impact of regional funds although they point out that EU wide 
economic recovery at that time may also have been an important 
contributory factor. 
 
An alternative approach to convergence is the distribution dynamics 
method originally suggested by Quah (1993a, 1993b, 1996a, 1996b, 
1997) and rooted in Markov Chain techniques. This approach 
examines the laws of motion of the entire cross-section distribution of 
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per capita incomes over time, identifying changes (or persistence) in 
the overall shape of the distribution and movements within it. The 
dynamics of the process can be modelled using either a discrete or 
continuous form of analysis (Bishop and Gripaios, 2006). In the 
discrete approach, the data is split into a number of income classes 
and the analysis derives a transition probability matrix which describes 
the probability of moving between classes over time. Alternatively, the 
income distribution can be treated as continuous and the dynamics can 
be described by a stochastic kernel which can be regarded as a 
continuous version of the transition probability matrix. Spatial patterns 
in the data can be examined by comparing transition probability 
matrices across regional groupings or conditioning the stochastic 
kernel relative to group membership. 
 
The distribution dynamics approach has the advantage of facilitating an 
analysis of the entire cross-sectional distribution of income rather than 
concentrating upon simple moments such as the mean or standard 
deviation. There have been a growing number of studies utilising this 
approach in recent years, many of which have identified complex 
patterns involving regions converging to multiple peaks in the income 
distribution and elements of persistence and divergence in it. (Bishop 
and Gripaios, 2006). Fingleton’s analysis (1997), for example, suggests 
that EU regions are converging to a set of multiple steady states from 
which economies are displaced by economic shocks.  Magrini (2003) 
concludes that persistence rather than convergence is the most 
obvious feature across European regions over the period 1980-95. In a 
study of European functional urban regions from 1978-94, Cheshire 
and Magrini (2000) conclude that a small group of regions appear to 
move away from the rest. Though the issue is not directly considered, 
this does not appear to suggest much change at the bottom of the 
distribution where Objective One funding has been applied.  
 
There have also been a number of studies utilising Markov techniques 
for individual countries. In the case of Great Britain, for example, 
Henley (2003) finds “twin peaks” in the income distribution with a 
substantial low income cluster existing alongside a smaller high income 
group.  Bishop and Gripaios (2004, 2006) find a complex pattern of 
change in the regional GB income distribution over time. The study 
concludes that there is no overall pattern of convergence across GB 
regions, although is some indication of a small number of counties 
achieving a persistently high position in the distribution. The study 
argues suggests that directing attention to the simple question as to 
whether convergence exists or not, risks oversimplifying a highly 
complex process of growth and change. This conclusion might equally 
apply to EU wide studies of convergence and might suggest that 
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analysis might be better directed towards understanding the complexity 
of the process of growth and change rather than simply concentrating 
upon the presence or absence of convergence 
 
Whilst there are considerable merits in the Markov approach, it is not 
without its own limitations. In the discrete approach, the choice of 
income classes is somewhat arbitrary and different classification 
schemes may yield different results and even destroy the Markov 
properties of the process. Continuous stochastic kernels alleviate this 
problem but largely rely upon a graphical method of interpretation. At 
present, the Markov approach is perhaps most useful for exploratory 
work rather than the detailed analysis of the factors determining 
changes in incomes over time, although conditioned stochastic kernels 
offer one approach to understanding spatial groupings amongst 
countries. For example, Quah (1996) finds that national 
macroeconomic factors and geographical spillovers are important in 
explaining the cross-sectional income distribution across European 
NUTS regions in the 1980s. 
 
The existence of distinct regional groupings often identified in the 
Markov approach has also been explored by Ezcurra et al (2005) 
utilising a polarization approach. This method examines the extent to 
which a population is distributed around a number of separate poles 
utilising polarization measures (similar to measures of inequality) 
originating in the work of Esteban and Rey (1994) and Esteban et al 
(1999). Utilising this approach requires exogenously identifying the 
number of groups to be examined. Ezcurra et al (2005) take a bipolar 
approach, identifying two groups of European NUTS 2 regions based 
on GVA per head in 1977.  They argue that such an approach 
facilitates an analysis of the extent to which Europe may be evolving 
into a “rich” and a “poor” group of regions. Their conclusions suggest a 
reduction in bipolarization over the period 1977-99 with the average per 
capita income in the “poor” group rising from 55% to 60% of the 
average of the other group. However, they point out that “the greater 
part of the reduction in inequality…. is seen to take place at the end of 
the 1970s, before reaching a point of near stagnation in the following 
two decades”. Thus the reduction in bi-polarisation does not occur in 
the period when the Structural Funds were most strongly applied.  
 
In order to examine the underlying determinants of bipolarization, 
Ezcurra et al (2005) re-partition the regions in terms of three factors - 
countries, geography (central, intermediate or peripheral) and industrial 
structure. They conclude that the national (country) component seems 
to be the main explanation of regional bi-polarisation and of its 
reduction through time. Geographical factors were of lesser 
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importance, again perhaps implying that the impact of the Structural 
Funds, much of which went to peripheral regions, was very marginal in 
explaining the limited convergence that may have occurred. The 
industrial structure component was less relevant than the other two 
factors.  
 
A final approach to examining emerging patterns among EU regions is 
that of Corrado et al (2005) who utilise NUTS 1 level data for 1975-99 
to search for clusters in GVA per worker in agriculture, manufacturing, 
market and non- market services. The clusters are defined by using 
stationarity tests for regional differences in per capita output across 
pairs of regions. The “observed” clusters are then compared with 
hypothesised regional groupings based upon different theories and 
models of regional growth and development. The hypothesised clusters 
are based upon indicators reflecting geographical factors (e.g. country 
membership, core-periphery), socio-demographic factors (e.g. 
population growth) and political variables which classify regions 
according to EU funding objective status. The results suggest that 
processes of regional convergence across the EU are complex and 
different over time. A number of regional convergence clusters were 
observed across all four of the industry sectors they looked at. 
However, there was little evidence “that the pattern of regional 
convergence across the EU correlates with regional policy intervention, 
as measured by the provision of Structural Fund and Cohesion Fund 
assistance”. Rather geographical proximity and socio-demographic 
characteristics seemed to be important. Geographical factors were, 
however, becoming less important over time especially in the clustering 
of manufacturing GVA per worker. 
 
Thus, it is clear that there is no shortage of convergence-related 
studies that directly or indirectly have relevance for the evaluation of 
EU regional policy. Unfortunately, there is less than unanimity in the 
conclusions, the results depending on time period, basic method of 
analysis, number of regions covered and model specification. Clearly, 
this limits the usefulness of these studies to those interested in the 
evaluation of past policy and the development of future interventions.  
 
 
Non convergence models 
 
Whilst the convergence issue has been central to academic 
approaches to studying income distributions within the EU, there are a 
number of studies which eschew this approach. These approaches 
typically attempt to explain the growth rate of regional GDP per capita 
in terms of a range of variables reflecting both underlying demand and 
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supply influences but excluding initial income (as in convergence 
approaches) as an explanatory variable.  In such an approach, demand 
factors may be included in the form of growth rates of the specific 
country to which regions belong, while supply variables can include 
measures of industrial structure, occupational structure, take-up of 
higher education, R&D intensity and so on.    However, though the 
problems of potential mis-specification may be lower than in conditional 
convergence models, they nevertheless exist. For example, a 
deleterious industrial structure or low take up of higher education may 
be associated with economic backwardness and receipt of Objective 1 
funds.  Moreover, leaving out natural convergence measures may 
ascribe more to policy effects than is justified. As Cheshire and Magrini 
(2000) point out, there is also the problem that regions themselves are 
inconsistently defined, reflecting, for example, traditional administrative 
and political boundaries in the member countries of the EU.  They 
advocate using functional urban regions (FURs) for this reason, 
although there are data limitations involved in such an approach. 
 
This “non-convergence” approach can potentially incorporate policy 
variables such as the input of Structural Funds as explanatory 
variables although few studies explicitly incorporate such variables. 
Cheshire and Magrini (2000), for example, test a model of this type to 
explain per capita income growth in functional urban regions in Europe. 
Explanatory variables include macroeconomic variables, industry 
structure, population density, research and human capital and change 
in economic potential arising from the spatial economic impact of 
European integration.  However, there is no direct assessment of the 
impact of the use of Structural Funds. Nevertheless, indirect evidence 
of the impact of EU funding arises from a number of studies.  De la 
Fuentes and Vives (1995), for example, examine Spain within the 
context of a growth model that includes public and human capital.  
They find that public investments in infrastructure and education (and 
the ERDF specifically) can help reduce regional income disparities.  
However, they suggest that the net effect on Spanish output would 
have been negative due to less efficient allocation of capital.  This is an 
interesting point that might support a policy of concentrating scarce 
economic development resources on the areas with greatest potential 
rather than the most need. 
 
Martin (1998a 1998b 1999a 1999b) and Bosca et al ((1999) also 
conclude that regional policy variables such as investments in public 
and human capital foster growth but that “natural” factors are more 
important than regional spending in engendering convergence.  
Moreover, the conclusions suggest that regional policy can only work 
well if the relevant national macroeconomic framework is appropriate. 
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Midelfart-Knarvik and Overmann (2002) examine how European 
integration has changed the location of industry and conclude that, 
while states and regions are becoming more specialised within the EU, 
the process is very slow. They argue that Structural Fund expenditures 
may have partly distorted the efficient allocation of economic activity, 
thereby reducing the potential gains from integration. For example, 
they conclude that too much R&D intensive industry had been 
encouraged to locate in countries that have low endowments of skilled 
labour.  
 
Arguably, the conclusion that the use of Structural Funds may have 
impeded the extent to which integration has improved the efficiency of 
the EU is not surprising for, clearly, the aim of designations such as 
Objective One is to reduce the necessity of labour to move from 
problem to prosperous regions in search of the best return. Even so, 
this raises very interesting questions about the targeting of scarce 
economic development funds in the context of the global 
competitiveness of the EU in total, an issue of some importance in the 
light of the findings of Dunford (2005), for example, that the EU is 
lagging behind the US in this regard.  
 
Multi-equation macro-econometric simulations  
 
An alternative approach to evaluation is to simulate the impact of policy 
intervention utilising multi-equation macro econometric models 
(reference needed here). In the specific case of evaluating the impact 
of EU Structural funds, it is necessary to utilise models which can pick 
up both leakages and feedbacks between assisted and non-assisted 
regions especially within member countries and also interrelationships 
between the EU and the rest of the world.  Inevitably, a danger with this 
approach is that the predictions emerging from the model may all too 
easily be assumed to be factual.  In practice, there are huge problems 
involved in constructing and utilising national econometric models let 
alone regional ones. Different theoretical beliefs of model builders, 
different degrees of sophistication, different assumptions of the future 
course of exogenous variables, underlying data inadequacies, the 
alternative treatment of shocks, and the adjustment of raw model 
output by “tender loving care” all give plenty of scope for very different 
outputs by alternative forecasting teams and/or lack of confidence in 
those outputs (Cuthbertson and Gripaios; 1997). 
 
One simulation approach which has been specifically developed to 
analyse the impact of the Structural Funds in Objective 1 regions is the 
HERMIN model (Bradley et al 1995).    This open economy model was 
originally designed in the 1990s and separate versions exist for some 
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of the regions and states to which the funds have been applied.  The 
model is disaggregated by broad sector and encompasses 
manufacturing (a mainly traded sector), market services (mainly non-
traded), agriculture and government (or non market) services (ESRI, 
2002). The model is made up of three main blocks. - a supply side 
(which determines output, factor inputs, wages, prices and productivity 
), an absorption side (which determines expenditures) and an income 
distribution side (determining private and public sector income). 
Though the model is essentially Keynesian, it does have some 
neoclassical features.  For example, manufacturing output is affected 
by price and cost competitiveness as well as demand while demands 
for factors of production are also sensitive to relative prices.  The core 
of the model has around 20 fully behavioural equations and the model 
was calibrated using time series of national accounts data for 1980-
2000.  
 
Clearly, the HERMIN model is highly aggregative and so, to be useful 
for Structural Fund evaluation, the funds themselves have to be 
aggregated into three policy areas.  The first is investment in improved 
physical infrastructure, the second investment in improvements in 
human resources (i.e. education and training) and the third is 
expenditure on direct aid to the productive sector (i.e. investment 
support, R&D, management training etc.). Simulations have been 
undertaken from 1993 to 2010, once on the basis of Structural Fund 
planned (rather than actual) expenditures from 1994-99 and once on 
the basis that no such expenditures had taken place.  The difference is 
then put down to the operation of the Structural Funds. It should be 
noted that the carry over effects of Structural Funds from 1989-93 and 
the continuation of aid from 2000-2006 are ignored.  So is the 
possibility that national/regional authorities might have spent more in 
problem regions had the Structural Funds been unavailable. 
 
Table 3 illustrates some of the results of the model in the form of a 
cumulative structural fund (CSF) multiplier defined as the cumulative 
percentage increase in GDP/Cumulative CSF share in GDP (ESRI, 
2002). 
 
Table 3 CSF94-99 Cumulative Objective 1 Multipliers 
 Greece Ireland Portugal Spain East 
Germany 
Northern 
Ireland 
1994-
1999 
0.67 1.44 1.12 1.07 1.69 1.24 
1994-
2002 
0.76 1.88 1.53 1.23 2.11 1.33 
1994- 1.07 2.83 2.55 1.77 4.44 1.48 
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2010 
 
Source: ESRI (2002) 
 
It can be seen that whilst, in the long run, the multipliers are all positive, 
there are significant differences amongst the areas evaluated.  ESRI 
(2002) argues that the high multiplier for East Germany is explained by 
the fact that it started in a much worse position than other regions and 
had most to gain in terms of catch up.  In addition, its initial 
infrastructure was poor, so infrastructure investment had great benefits. 
It is also argued that Ireland benefited from its openness, whilst Greece 
suffered from the fact that it was the most closed economy. The 
analysis concludes that “Perhaps the lesson to be drawn from the 
analysis ............ is that structural change in an economy – involving 
openness, institutional quality, etc. – is driven by forces beyond the 
CSF.  The CSF may serve to accelerate these changes, but is the 
wider challenges of EU membership that probably dominate”. (ESRI, 
2002). 
 
It is important to note that the multiplier estimates of the type outlined in 
Table 3 should be treated with caution. Indeed, ESRI (2002) give their 
own health warning noting that other policy shocks and external 
economic events will have operated at the same time as the regional 
funds and are hard to disentangle. It is also recognised that the 
HERMIN models have weaknesses including insufficient allowance for 
crowding out and that the method of incorporating regional policy into 
the HERMIN models draws on incomplete research into the impact of 
increased public  investment on economic growth and development. 
Other models (e.g. the QUEST model of the EU (Röger, 1996)) 
inevitably suffer from many of the same defects.  Clearly, the ideal 
situation would be to have a single quality model of the whole EU 
distinguishing Objective One economies from the rest.  Such a model 
could then be used to estimate the net impact on Objective One 
regions of CSF expenditures and the costs to the more prosperous 
parts of Europe that fund them. However, such a model is a long way 
off.  Indeed, the defects of the present approach have led some 
commentators to favour much simpler single-equation econometric 
approaches of the type outlined earlier (Ederveen et al 2002). 
 
Micro-economic case studies 
 
A final method of impact evaluation involves microeconomic case 
studies which focus upon examining what has happened in specific 
regions either in terms of the impact on the region of total regional 
funding or of specific policy measures.  This approach can, in theory at 
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least, consider impacts on regional per capita income and can also be 
used to assess the extent to which Structural Funds have created the 
foundations for future economic growth, the extent to which some 
interventions have exerted more leverage than others and whether 
there are lessons to be learned from the perspective of the specific 
region or for EU policy making in general. Of course, all the caveats 
noted previously concerning data quality, overlapping policies and 
noise inevitably apply to evaluation studies of this type.  
 
A number of early case studies are reported in Bachtler and Turok 
(1997).  They seem to suggest that the economic effects of cohesion 
support were hard to quantify and, therefore, difficult to assess.  
However, it seems likely that any effects were modest. Moreover, while 
the receipt of funds encouraged cooperation between local economic 
agents and strategic planning, it also led to extensive rent seeking i.e. 
regional plans were often designed to draw down funds per se rather 
than to make the most use of them.  
 
In order to examine this approach to evaluation in more detail it is 
useful to consider the various ex post appraisals of Objective 1 funding 
for 1994-2000. A useful starting point is the EU overall evaluation of the 
individual country evaluations (ECOTEC 2003a).  This points out that 
“there are still a number of difficulties in quantifying the consequences 
of intervention as a result of a lack of systematic data collection on the 
part of monitoring systems”.  It also goes on to say that “most of the 
effects of cohesion policy, however, cannot readily be expressed in 
quantitative terms.  Rather added value comes from factors such as 
strategic planning, integrated development policies, partnership, 
evaluation and the exchange of experience, know how and good 
practice between regions”.  The report also notes that  successful 
intervention relies strongly at a local level on a sound and stable 
economic framework, a judicious choice of strategic priorities, 
administrative and institutional capacity and the quality of the projects 
put forward for support. 
 
A difficulty for case study evaluations in identifying transformative 
impacts stems from the timeframe within which they are undertaken. 
Generally, transformative impacts are slow to emerge, a fact which is 
illustrated by the stability of many Objective 1 designations. Within 
programmes, spending tends to have been skewed towards the end of 
the programme period, reflecting problems in ‘gearing up’ to deliver a 
new programme. So, even if technical difficulties are overcome, lags 
may delay the full impact of the programme until beyond the date of the 
evaluation.  Even so, qualitative benefits of the type outlined above 
would have been expected at some stage to have led to measurable 
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economic benefits and should be picked up in evaluations of regions 
which have been in receipt of Objective One funds for more than a 
single programming period. 
 
A number of specific conclusions from the ECOTEC (2003a) study 
were that: 
  
(1) Transport investments and those in human capital make the 
strongest  contribution to economic development.  This partly 
conflicts with the evidence  of Rodriguez-Pose and Fratesi (2004) who 
argued that there had been too  much focus on infrastructure; 
 
(2) Private sector investment was levered in but not on the scale 
anticipated.  In  this regard, the Cohesion countries and the UK 
and France did less well than  Austria, Germany, Netherlands and 
Belgium; 
 
(3) The use of Structural Funds to develop research capacity has 
not always  been optimal. “In come cases, however, there appears to 
have been  over-investment in research centres in relation to both 
needs and potential,  so leading to their under utilisation”; 
 
(4) Lack of coordination between member countries has caused 
problems with  transport infrastructure e.g. the new Somport road 
tunnel through the  Pyrenees joins to a motorway on Spanish side but 
only to an old national road  on the French one. 
 
Individual country evaluations highlight a number of the points already 
made. .In the case of Greece (European Enterprise Organisation, 
2002), for example, the evaluation report argues that there was little 
impact from Structural Funds until the mid 1990s, since when 
economic growth has been above the EU average.  The report argues 
that this is related to major reforms of national economic policy during 
the 1990s.  Thus “the critical difference between the first and the 
second CSF is that, during the second programming period, EU 
transfers have been utilised in combination with national structural 
policies, thus complementing efforts rather than merely substituting for 
the lack of policies”. The lesson seems to be that other national policies 
and good institutional arrangements are necessary prerequisites for 
CSF success.  Such a conclusion further highlights the difficulty of 
disentangling the effects of domestic and EU policies in any evaluation 
exercise. The report concludes that while the CSF has led to an 
increase in GVA, it has had little effect on employment though it may 
well have declined without it. 
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In Greece, infrastructure spending was around 46% of the Structural 
Fund total.  The consultants examined ten large infrastructure projects 
and found overall efficiency was “modest”.  Most of the projects “exhibit 
time delays, cost overruns and reduced actual physical output”.  A 
variety of reasons explain this “including gaps in the institutional, 
legislative and administrative framework surrounding public works and 
inadequate technical and environmental studies”.  The (lack of) 
capabilities of the native construction sector were also a problem.  A 
further problem in the Greek case is that the evaluation of Structural 
Funds doesn’t seem to have had much effect in improving matters over 
time.  Thus, the study notes that “it cannot be argued that the 
evaluation findings had any major influence on the implementation of 
the programmes or affected the shaping of strategies and the 
conclusion of institutional arrangements for the 2nd CSF”. 
 
In the case of Ireland, the evaluators (Fitzpatrick Associates, 2003) 
utilised the HERMIN model. The report was critical of the fact that there 
was “a tendency for strategies to reflect planned investments, rather 
than vice versa”. Even so, it suggests that the impact of Objective 1 
was highly favourable.  They point out that the “1994-1999 CSF 
coincided with a period of very rapid economic and social change and 
convergence in Ireland.  The CSF cannot, of course, be credited as the 
sole cause of this development.  However, alongside a number of other 
key factors – previous investment in the Irish education system, good 
macroeconomic policy, the impact of European integration on trade 
and investment, and a positive external environment – the Structural 
Funds were an important part of a virtuous economic circle”.  Again, 
the emphasis upon the importance of combining Objective One 
intervention with other appropriate policies and the difficulty this poses 
for evaluation are central to the analysis. An additional problem in the 
Irish case is that the whole country qualified for funding and so there 
are no comparator regions within the country. A similar problem arises 
in the Portugal evaluation (CIDEC, 2003) which is also model-based 
and favourable with the consultants estimating that the contribution of 
the CSF to growth was 0.42 percentage points.  
 
The Spanish evaluation (CEET-Ecotec, 2003) is model-based but, as 
some of Spain is not covered by Objective One, there are comparator 
regions.  The evaluation notes that between 1995 and 2000 average 
GDP per capita in the Objective 1 regions increased by 18.4% and 
reached 68.7% of the EU average from a base of 65.4% in 1995. 
However, the relative performance of Objective 1 regions in 
comparison to other regions in Spain was poor, GDP per capita 
remaining at 83.7% of the Spanish average.  The evaluation concludes 
that “It is difficult to quantify the economic effects generated by the 
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Structural Funds in the Objective 1 regions.” Moreover, the report notes 
that a “key absence was the lack of target output and results indicators 
in many cases which would have enabled the performance of the 
Operational Plan to be more effectively monitored and facilitated 
evaluation”.  Either way, the fact that “employment has grown by 
20.82% in Objective 1 regions and by 20.33% in Spain” would not 
seem to provide convincing evidence that Structural Fund interventions 
have had significant benefits. 
 
The Italy evaluation (Ismeri Europa, 2003) suggests that Structural 
Fund interventions have been “a vital means in the support of 
development policies at a time of heavy reductions in national 
spending”.  This seems to imply that EU funding was substituted for 
reduced national support. In any event, the best reading of the results 
would suggest that the most that the CSF could have achieved is to 
have stopped the gap between north and south from widening.  Indeed, 
the evaluation emphasises that the “productivity gap between the two 
areas of the country remains constant, around 30%, during the period 
1995-1999”.  The Italy evaluation also contains some important 
criticisms of the operation of the funds. It particular, it notes that “The 
real problem was that all the CSF programmes, even though each had 
its own rationale, did not compose an integrated consistent strategy for 
development”.  This seems to have led to “no selection of objectives 
and a very high fragmentation of resources”.  
 
Interestingly, the UK evaluation (Ecotec, 2003b) was also highly critical 
of many aspects of the decision making process and, in particular, with 
the lack of strategic focus.  The report states that “PMC (Programme 
Monitoring Committee) meetings were often dominated by discussions 
relating to financial absorption rather than questions of strategic 
rationale”, while stakeholders reported that the “political nature of 
meetings and a defensive culture did not lend itself to open and honest 
dialogue between all parties”.  A specific  problem was that the 
“weaknesses in ‘strategic thinking’ were perceived by some to be 
reinforced by ‘money chasing’ by public sector organisations who were 
motivated by the desire to get their ‘fair share’ of resources for 
particular sector or area interests”. Given the above, it is not surprising 
that the UK report noted that there were also “weaknesses in terms of 
the integration between different elements of the programmes”. The 
overall conclusion was that the programme strategies were “generally 
lacking with regard to any explicit rationale regarding prioritisation” and 
had “limited focus”. 
 
In terms of impacts, there is the rather disturbing conclusion that 
“despite increases in GDP in real terms, all three (supported) areas fell 
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back over the programme period relative to the UK performance”. 
Moreover, though there seems to have been considerable job creation, 
much of it has been in the public sector and, in Merseyside and 
Northern Ireland, in call centres.  In short, there has been above 
average growth in lower value added sectors which may not bode well 
for the long term. There was, however, some hope raised that the 
contribution of Structural Funding to increasing economic activity would 
have demonstrable benefits over the long term, underlining the caveat 
about the timing of evaluations made above.  The evaluators also 
suggest that, in all cases, “the programmes can be viewed as making 
an important contribution to moving economic signs in the right 
direction alongside the wider effects of strong national growth and, in 
the case of Northern Ireland, the positive developments in the peace 
process”. Again, this seems to suggest that it is hard to distinguish 
Structural Fund effects from national factors.  
 
The UK report concludes that infrastructure spending is more highly 
regarded than business support elements, the latter being “too broad” 
and lacking focus on “higher order functions such as export and market 
development and sectors with growth potential”.  This was seen as 
having hindered attempts to improve business competitiveness.  
Moreover, the human resource elements did not significantly improve 
the skills base; indeed,  there was too great a focus on low level 
vocational training. This may be a reflection of the skills base in 
assisted areas and on the new found enthusiasm for “Community 
Economic Development” (CED) type activities and capacity building in 
the 1994 round of programmes, which saw efforts to tackling social 
exclusion as a two stage process, with engagement and development 
of basic skills a necessary precursor to training facilitating re-entry into 
the labour market. Interestingly, ECOTEC were also commissioned by 
a UK Government Department to examine the added value of the 
Structural Funds (ECOTEC, 2003c). The conclusion was that they “do 
not seem to contribute a significant level of added value”. 
 
In Austria, Objective 1 funding was only available to Burgenland and 
does not appear to have significantly improved that region’s share of 
national GDP (Stumm, 2002).  The report makes the familiar criticism 
that “although one can observe a rather positive development in 
Burgenland as regards the convergence of income levels and the 
purchasing power during the years 1995-99, it is difficult to clearly 
identify the economic impact of Structural Funds interventions on these 
variables”.  
 
The evaluation of the former East Germany (Stumm and Robert, 2003) 
is model-based, probably inevitably given a lack of data and “a 
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reluctance to specify quantitative impacts or even output targets”.  
Moreover, even the model based assessment was hampered because 
of noise relating, in particular, to macroeconomic effects and industrial 
restructuring.  One interesting point is that much expenditure in East 
Germany “flew back” to West Germany.  
 
The Netherlands report (Ecorys, 2003) is for Flevoland, which qualifies 
because of extensive outward commuting. Interestingly, job growth was 
3 times the national average from 1994-99 but population growth was 
also fast such that GVA per head relative to the Dutch figure fell.  Again 
problems were reported associated with poor record keeping. 
 
The Belgian report is for its part of Hainaut (Ecotec/Idea, 2003).  It 
records that“the evolution of GDP is (Belgian) Hainaut was rather 
unfavourable with GVA per capita falling from 77.3% of EU average in 
1992 to 73.4% in 1998. Despite this, the report argues that there is 
“consensus that important progress has been made during the nineties 
and that industrial decline has at least been stopped”.  The evaluators 
argue that Structural Funds did not have a large impact in the short 
term because a “significant share of the measures/actions are of a 
structural type, which don’t directly translate in job creation”. 
 
Finally, the French report (Ecotec, 2003d). is for six regions, only two of 
which, French Hainaut and Corsica, are in Europe.  It concludes that 
“as for the GDP, it indeed progresses in every region in absolute value, 
but the relative improvement with regard to the European average is 
weak”. In fact GVA per head relative to the EU15 fell in both Corsica 
and Nord Par de Calais (of which Hainaut is a part) from 1994-1995.  
Any gains seem to have been in job growth, both Corsica and Hainaut 
having “shown their capacity to create activities and jobs”.  Both 
regions had job growth above the French average at this time. 
 
It is clear that the programme evaluations present a mixed picture of 
the effect of policy interventions. The difficulty of identifying impacts, 
particularly in the sense of isolating Structural Fund effects from other 
macro-economic measures and other noise, is clearly apparent and is 
an inherent impediment to the evaluation process. In addition, weak 
record keeping and the emphasis placed upon qualitative objectives 
add to the problems of the evaluation process. Many of the evaluations 
suggest that the benefits of interventions will be felt in the long run, 
after the time horizon of the evaluation, emphasising the problem of 
determining the appropriate time period over which to measure 
impacts.  Only time will tell if the optimistic statements concerning the 
potential long term benefits of the interventions are justified. 
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CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
The analysis presented in this paper raises some very important issues 
regarding the impact of Objective One funding.  The first is that, in 
practice, it is very difficult to disentangle the impact of such regional 
funding relative to the effect of benefits of access to the European 
market, the enhanced possibilities of catch up such access has offered 
to successive new entrants, the gradual development of the single 
market, and where appropriate, the adoption of the single currency.  
Policies of national governments, some macroeconomic, some 
microeconomic and others directed at institutional reform have also 
affected the environment in which Objective One funds have been 
applied.  In many cases, national and regional governments have 
adopted complementary policies directed at the same target variables 
that Objective One is attempting to address.  In such circumstances, 
only the impact of policies, in the round, can be assessed. 
 
A second important point is that the results of the impact assessments 
often conflict being sensitive to choice of start and end period, to the 
method of assessment adopted and, for similar methods, to the 
specification of econometric equations.  This raises questions about 
the value of official evaluation and about some of the academic 
research which has been done on the topic.  For the official evaluation, 
the issue is perhaps whether the current extensive monitoring and 
evaluation procedure is something of a waste of resources if it is 
incapable of throwing much light on whether Objective One has broadly 
helped the development of lagging regions, what has worked where, 
what has not, and the reasons for success or failure.  Perhaps a 
simpler system recognising the inherent limitations of evaluation is 
necessary and more consideration and resources need to be given to 
improving data quality.   
 
As for academic work, there is perhaps scope for a more detailed 
exploration of the reason why extensive work on the same or similar 
datasets has produced such different conclusions. 
 
 As far as it is possible to ascertain, a broad consensus would seem to 
be that there has been slow convergence between the member 
countries of the EU from 1980-2001 and also slow convergence among 
EU regions.  If anything, however, the rate of convergence seems to 
have slowed down.  Since Objective One funding has been generous 
in the last decade relative to the one before, this may indicate a 
worsening environment for regional policy in that much of the scope for 
catch up among the EU 15 may have already been exploited.  If so, 
that may be taken as ample justification for transferring the bulk of 
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Objective One funding in future rounds to the new member states.  As 
will be argued below, there are other reasons why care should be 
taken in this regard. 
 
Another interesting point is that there is considerable, though not 
consistent, evidence of a worsening regional divide within specific 
countries, in some of which (e.g. Greece) the whole of the territory has 
been covered by Objective One funding and some (e.g. the UK, Italy 
and Spain) where only part has been covered.  Much further work 
might usefully be done on this topic but the evidence for the UK would 
suggest that the move to a service based economy with key functions 
in capital or provincial cities, outsourcing and management de-layering 
have all been influential in driving this process  (Gripaios and Munday, 
2000; Gripaios et al 2000).  This may suggest that the scope for the 
successful application of Objective One funding in poorly performing 
parts of otherwise successful national economies may be very limited.  
As suggested by the case studies, much of the funding inevitably leaks 
to core regions and it is difficult to find strategic investments which can 
have a long term impact. These points have been argued forcefully in 
the case of the UK Objective One regions by Gripaios and Bishop 
(2006).  
 
A further related point is that some studies suggest that European 
regions are converging to a set of multiple steady states, the 
performance of which is determined by factors such as distance from 
and access to the core, educational attainment, industrial structure, R 
& D capability, corruption and institutional quality.  That raises 
important issues as to what can or should be done in terms of regional 
spending.  Is it justifiable, for instance, to continue to concentrate so 
much funding on all or part of the worst performing group when, in the 
final analysis, it could be argued that the scope for redistribution within 
Europe will be critically dependent on the competitiveness of Europe in 
the world economy. In this regard, the criticisms of Midelfart-Knarvik 
and Overmann (2002) of the impact of Structural Fund spending in 
slowing the gains from integration are important. It is arguable, given 
the recent poor performance of Europe relative to the US (Dunford, 
2005) that it may be important to do rather more to maximise the 
potential of the better performing regions or at least those with the most 
potential. The latter are not necessarily the poorest performing regions. 
 
It seems clear that “success stories” in terms of improvements in 
lagging regions are typically associated with a combination of factors of 
which regional funding is only one (perhaps small) part. In Ireland, for 
example, a highly educated workforce, a “good” legal system, a 
favourable tax regime for companies and for R & D, the English 
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language and exploitation of ties with America have all played a part.  
At the other end of the spectrum, the evidence for Greece suggests 
that early rounds of Objective One funding had less impact than they 
should have done because of inappropriate macroeconomic policies 
and institutional and societal weaknesses.  That may suggest that care 
should have been taken to make sure that the right foundations were in 
place in new member states before these countries were allocated 
large amounts of Objective One funding for economic development 
purposes. This was not done in the case of the 2004 entrants but is 
being applied to some extent in Bulgaria and Romania.  
 
It is also important to recognise that that Objective One funds might 
have been better directed in terms of the use to which they have been 
put in specific regions.  Some analyses have suggested that too much 
has been spent on business support and agriculture and too little on 
education and human capital.  More controversial is the impact of 
infrastructure spending, some analysts arguing that it has been highly 
beneficial, others that it has increased the scope for leakages given 
that most has been on transport links to the core.  These are important 
issues, for they question the extent to which EU funds should be spent 
on places or on people.  Spend it on places and there may be no 
sustainable improvement in economic viability so that people may 
continue to have to leave; spend it on human capital development in 
problem regions and you may enable the newly qualified to leave and 
reduce economic potential still further. All this suggests that 
considerable care should be taken as to where to direct funds within 
Europe and indeed within lagging regions.  In the latter, there have 
perhaps been too many weaknesses in strategic thinking, weaknesses 
compounded by pressure from local interest groups, local media and 
indeed EU funding rules to spend allocated monies without sufficient 
consideration of what will be there to show for such spending some 
years after the programme has been wound up. 
 
Of course, policy evolves so an interesting issue is the extent to which 
the funding rules and guidelines for 2007-2013 take account of these 
criticisms. 
 
In the new funding period, the Structural Funds are to be used to help 
drive the Lisbon Agenda on economic reform. In this regard, the focus 
is much more on strategic interventions than was previously the case, 
these being directed at three main themes of jobs, growth and 
competitiveness. 
 
Objective One now disappears as a categorisation but is replaced by 
the term “convergence regions”, these being those with GVA per head 
 33 
less than 75% of the EU average for the period 2000-2002. They will 
continue to receive the bulk (82%) of the Structural Funds and most will 
be in the new member states. The policy, therefore, continues to be 
very broad brush and, while there is undoubtedly considerable scope 
for catch-up, it is arguable whether such a concentration of funding is in 
Europe’s long term interests. A further negative point is that, since the 
funds will still be allocated to Nuts 2 regions, there will still be plenty of 
scope for leakage. 
 
More positively, the fact that the use of this part of the Structural Funds 
is to be focused on “speeding up the convergence of the least 
developed Member States and regions by improving conditions for 
growth and employment through the increasing and improvement of 
the quality of investment in physical and human capital, the 
development of innovation and the knowledge society, adaptability to 
economic and social changes, the protection and improvement of the 
environment and administrative efficiency” (European Commission 
2006) suggests that some lessons have been learnt and that the EU is 
embracing a more competitive and adaptable economic vision. 
 
The real issue is what happens on the ground. Member States have 
agreed the new priorities but, as in the past, there may be plenty of 
scope to use EU monies sub-optimally both from the point of view of 
their own citizens and those of Europe in total. 
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